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Daijosai and the Separation of Religion and State
Thomas Makoto Naruse ※
Abstract
Daijosai, which is regarded as an indispensable ceremony for the accession of the throne, is a Shinto
ceremony. Therefore, as Japanese Constitution defines separation of church and state, it is not held
as a national ceremony (a state act) but held as a ceremony of the imperial house. On the other hand,
since it is said to be an indispensable ceremony for the accession of the throne, government finds public
significance, and the cost is covered by the national expenses. Criticisms that claim violation of separation
of church and state arise, and many lawsuits were filed.
This article reveals that behind the argument of Daijosai and separation of church and state, there are
two contexts. On the one side, Japanese Constitution is drafted on the introspection of Meiji Constitution,
and restriction of emperor’s authority, denial of his deity, abolishing state Shinto, etc. were sought. On
the other side, the emperor have been religious and ceremonial being throughout Japanese history, and
such existence is deeply rooted both in history and culture. The conflict between these two contexts is
inevitable because the constitution maintained the emperor system and at the same time provided for the
separation of church and state.
Keywords: Tenno, Japanese Emperor, Accession to the Throne, Sokuinorei, Daijosai, Separation of Religion
and State, Japanese Constitution, Shinto Ceremony, National Ceremony (State Act), Ceremony of the
Imperial House, National Expense

1. Introduction
A change of era from Heisei to Reiwa occurred on May 1, 2019, the next day of Emperor Akihito’s
abdication . Accession to the Japanese throne is conditioned on the death of the previous emperor since
the establishment of the Meiji Constitution. The Imperial House Law had been amended in accordance
with the will of the former emperor and succession took place while the former emperor is alive.
Although various works have examined the series of events leading to the former emperor’s
abdication, this paper deals more generally with the problem of emperor and the principle of the
separation of religion and state, that emerges with ceremonies of imperial succession. A number of
ceremonies accompany the accession of the throne1, among which secular events are performed as
national ceremonies (or state acts) and those that involve religion are performed as ceremonies of the
imperial house. This distinction reflects the considerations given to the separation of religion and state as
stipulated by the Constitution of Japan. Although previous works have critiqued that religious elements
have not been entirely dispelled with in state ceremonies, this paper specifically deals with the Daijosai,
a Shinto ceremony that is regarded as being essential to the imperial accession. As such, the Daijosai
is not a national ceremony but rather a ceremony of the imperial house; however, due to its stated
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indispensability and having an official character, its cost is covered as a national expense. Critiques of
violations of separation of religion and state often invoke such cases of spending state funds for religious
ceremonies and the participation of public officials in those ceremonies.
In this article, I will examine the issue of the Daijosai and the separation of religion and state. First, I
will examine the changes in the basis of the Japanese emperor’s position and the being of emperor under
the Meiji Constitution versus as under the current Constitution. Next, I will review the drafting process
of Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution, which defines the separation of religion and state, and clarify
the “purpose” of that clause, following which I will explore the religious aspects of the Daijosai from
the government’s perspective and describe the process of enacting the Imperial House Law. The latter
discussion will include remarks made by then Prince Akishinonomiya that raised doubts about public
expenditures for Daijosai based on the principle of the separation of religion and state. Finally, based on
the above, I will review some court cases and academic theories concerning the Heisei Daijosai.
2. Basis of Emperor’s Position and its Changes
(1) Religious Nature of the Emperor
Under the Meiji Constitution, the emperor was described as Arahitogami (a god who appears in
the form of a human), and the Constitution stipulated that his person was “sacred and inviolable2”. As
Professor Lokowandt explains, traditionally, the emperor “was at the center of Shinto3,” and his existence
remains inseparable from that system of beliefs and traditions4.
The emperor’s status was greatly transformed after the World War II. In the so-called “Imperial
Rescript Denying His Divinity (Professing His Humanity)” declared on Januar y 1, 1946, Emperor
Hirohito denied his deification5. Article 1 of the Japanese Constitution makes the emperor a “symbol of
the State and of the unity of the people6”; moreover, his position is derived “from the will of the people.7”
This marked a significant change from the previous Constitution, under which his status was based on
“deity.” With regard to this point, reference is made to the view that it is inevitable that the basis of the
emperor’s status was transferred to “national sovereignty” because the foundational concept of “the deity”
was abandoned8.
However, in reality, the emperor continues to be a religious entity even under the current
Constitution. There are various Shinto elements in the emperor’s life, including ceremonies at the three
shrines of the palace and the “imperial regalia” associated with his status. According to Yamamoto, the
emperor held 32 ceremonies in 2004, which accounted for 5% of all of his duties9. Thus, even after the
World War II, the emperor continues to have religious dimensions. Such religious aspects are often taken
up by the Diet, including the crown prince’s wedding featuring a Shinto ceremony as a national ceremony

2

Dai Nihon Teikoku Kenpo [Constitution] [Meiji Kenpo] art. 1 (Japan)
Ernst Lokowandt, The Secular and the Cultic Side of Tenno, in Universality and Peculiarity of the Constitutions in
the World 479 (Seibundo 2010).
4 Id. at 478.
5 https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/056shoshi.html
6 Nihonkoku Kenpo [Constitution][Kenpo] art. 1 (Japan).
7 Id.
8 Kudo Tatsuro, Tenno no Koui ha Shukyoteki de Attemo Kamawanaika? —Tenno no <Gishiki> to Seikyo Bunri—, 264
Hogaku Kyoshitu 44, 45 (2002).
9 Yamamoto Masato, Tenno Heika no Zen Shigoto 55 (Kodansha Gendai Shinsho 2009).
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as well as the ritual ceremonies of the imperial palace10. Although the Togyokurei that stipulated the
Shinto ceremonies of Imperial family which enacted under the Meiji Constitution was abolished, a notice
issued in May 2, 1947 declares that in cases in which former rules have been abolished and new rules
have not yet made, the government should continue to follow earlier precedents11. In this way, the style of
imperial ceremonies largely follows that of under the Meiji Constitution, thus indicating the continuity of
the emperor’s religious dimensions.
(2) Characteristics of the Emperor: Institutional Design in the Drafting Process of the Current
Constitution
One of the “Hottest” topic during the drafting of the current Constitution following the World War
II was making revisions to the political system, particularly reforming those aspects concerning the
emperor and placing restrictions on his authority.
As approved by the United States State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), SWNCC-228
stated that maintaining the imperial system in its previous form did not meet Japan’s goal of
democratization and would require various changes12. Similarly, the General Headquarters (GHQ) report
on the so-called Matsumoto Draft strongly criticized that sovereignty remained in the emperor’s hands
and the national sovereignty required by the 10th section of the Potsdam Declaration had not been
enacted13.
U.S. General Douglas MacArthur favored maintaining the emperor system as a means of avoiding
public backlash and facilitating the occupation14. As a result, two goals were pursued when drafting
the current Constitution: maintaining the emperor system and thorough democratization. In a meeting
between the “Steering Committee” and “Committee on the Emperor (original draft)” of the GHQ on
Februar y 6, 1946, the emperor’s status was drafted as the symbol of the state and the unity of the
people15, and in the explanatory notes to the constitutional revision, it was stipulated that Japan would
“establish a constitutional monarchy with sovereignty re-posing in the people by modifying the Emperor
system and making the Emperor the ceremonial head of the state16”. This statement also reflects the
priority of preventing the emperor’s exploitation by evil state leaders, as had occurred in the past17. This
stance of the GHQ regarding the emperor system was consistent during the entire drafting process.
The meaning of the status of “symbol” and the issue of the “national polity” were frequently discussed
during early deliberations at the Imperial Parliament18, and the national polity and place of sovereignty
were at the center of discussions in both the House of Representatives and the House of Peers19.

10 The work on the discussion about the Emperor in Diet, see generally, Ohara Yasuo ed., Shoroku —Koshitu wo
Meguru Kokkai Giron (Tendensha 1997).
11 Saito Kenji, Shiryo Shusei Shocho Tennosei (1), 933 Jurist 236, 305 (1989).
12 Takayanagi Kenzo et al. eds., Nihonkoku Kenpo Seitei no Katei —Rengou-koku Sou-Shireibu Gawa no Kiroku ni
Yoru I Genbun to Honyaku [The Making of the Constitution of Japan Vol. I Documents] 414-14 (Yuhikaku 1972).
13 Id. at 81-82.
14 Kenpo Kaisei Mondai Shiryoshu Jokan 33 (Watanabe Osamu ed., Junposha 2015).
15 Takayanagi, supra note 12, at 133.
16 Id. at 305.
17 Id. at 308-09.
18 This article pick up some examples. As the work about other discussions, see generally, Shimizu Shin, Chikujo
Nihonkoku Kenpo Shingiroku dai 1 kan [1 Clause by Clause Record of Deliberations on Japanese Constitution in
Imperial Diet] (Yuhikaku 1962).
19 This article do not step in further. See, Sato Tatsuo, Nihonkou Kenpo Seiritsushi dai 4 kan [4 History of drafting
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Regarding the emperor’s status, the government stated that “It is determined that the Emperor should be
in the position to represent the nation and embody the unity of the people20” so as to eliminate the past
mystery and unreality embodied in the position21. In addition, to explain the reduction of the emperor’s
authority, the government stated that “people in power are sometimes invaded by the evil ideas and they
distort people’s will, indulge the national politics, and implement reckless policy under the name of the
Emperor, and finally led the nation to ruin22”. Moreover, during the discussion about the provisions of
Article 4 expressed the emperor’s role as “reigns, but doesn’t govern23” and the “center of admiration”24,
which reflects the concept of the emperor as a “symbol”25. The emperor’s ceremonial character was
repeatedly reiterated in other documents as well, and the stance of depoliticization and transformation to
a ceremonial entity was consistent.
Thus, under the current Constitution, the emperor’s status is considered non-political and ceremonial
in character. The grounds for the position’s existence are not based on the emperor’s status as a deity
but rather on principle of national sovereignty. In reality, the emperor remains a religious figure; on the
other hand, the Constitution also stipulates the separation of religion and state. For this reason, events
such as the emperor’s religious ceremonies are carried out as “private” acts, and their related costs are
expended from inner court expenses, i.e., “private monies”. Nonetheless, although such “separation” has
been made, there are places where they intersect, the best example of which is the Daijosai. In the next
section, I will examine the principle of separation of religion and state before considering the Daijosai.
3. Separation of Religion and State and State Shinto
The Japanese Constitution defines the principle of separation of religion and state in Articles 20 and
89, the latter of which is in the chapter on finance clauses. There were two (partly overlapping) purposes
for enacting the separation of religion and state clauses in the Constitution of Japan, namely ensuring
religious freedom and preventing the restoration of state Shinto. Each objective had previously been
expressed in GHQ directives. Article 20 reflects the GHQ’s “Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil
and Religious Liberties,26” as well as the guarantee of freedom of religion stated in paragraph 10 of the
Potsdam Declaration27.
Another GHQ requirement, the so-called “Shinto Directive”28, more vividly reflects Japan’s unique
circumstances. The beginning of this document states its purpose to “free the Japanese people from
direct or indirect compulsion to believe or profess to believe in a religion or cult officially designated by
the state,29” “lift from the Japanese people the burden of compulsory financial support of an ideology

process of Japanese Constitution] 549 (Sato Isao ed., Yuhikaku 1994).
20 Id. at 505.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 538.
24 This phrase was often used. As another example, see Id. at 561.
25 This point is seen in other parts as well. For some examples, see, Id. at 690-91, and Id. at 857.
26 http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/9885156, http://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/nfile/3229
27 https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/etc/j06.html
28 Official title is ”Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of
Shinto”. The text in English is provided websites below: http://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/nfile/3229, http://dl.ndl.go.jp/
info:ndljp/pid/9885515
29 Id.
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which has contributed to their war guilt, defeat, suffering, privation, and present deplorable condition,30”
prevent “a recurrence of the perversion of Shinto theory and beliefs into militaristic and ultra-nationalistic
propaganda designed to delude the Japanese people and lead them into wars of aggression,31” and assist
“the Japanese people in a rededication of their national life to building a new Japan based upon ideals of
perpetual peace and democracy32.” Thus, this document reflects the recognition that Shinto was “used”
to carry out the war, and based on which concrete measures were mentioned in the below articles of the
directive, and conceptions of the directive are reflected in the clauses on separation of religion and state
of the Japanese Constitution33.
A similar view was expressed in the GHQ’s discussions on the drafting of the Constitution. In a
meeting between the steering committee and committee on civil rights (original draft), Colonel Roest
asserted that “this Article was designed to prevent the abuse of spiritual authority to political ends34”
and ’’Japan has been a priest-ridden country for generations and political tyranny has been reinforced
by the threat of spiritual punishment35’’. Similarly, the Japanese government explained in the Imperial
Parliament that “Traditionally… the government has treated shrines as non-religious beings. According
to the spirit of the Potsdam Declaration and with the Directive from the GHQ, shrines have been
separated from the nation36.” The above examples demonstrate the recognition that Shinto was a de facto
national religion, and the aim of dealing with state Shinto is strongly reflected in the separation of religion
and state clauses of the current Constitution. This background will be referred to when considering the
emperor’s religious nature.
4. Religious Character of the Daijosai
(1) Sokuinorei (Ceremony of the Accession of the Throne) and Daijosai
Ceremony of the accession of the throne (sokuinorei) of the emperor Naruhito was the second one
under the current Constitution. The Sokuinorei consists of several national ceremonies and events. As the
Imperial Household Office explains:
This is considered as an act in matters of state designated by the Constitution, and consists of
Kenji-to-Shokei-no-gi (Accession Ceremony to inherit the Imperial Regalia and the State and Privy
Seals), Sokui-go-Choken -no-gi (His Majesty’s First Audience Ceremony after the Accession with
the Head of the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary and other Representatives of the people),
Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi (Enthronement Ceremony), Shukuga-Onretsu-no- gi (Imperial Procession
by motorcar after the Enthronement Ceremony) and Kyoen-no-gi (Court Banquets) (Designated
by the Imperial House Law, Article 24)37 .
30

Id.
Id.
32 Id.
33 An example of recent work dealing with Shinto Directive and Constitution, Oshima Kayoko, Shusho Kakuryo no
Yasukuni Jinja Sanpai no Goukensei, in Takami Katsutoshi Sensei Koki Kinen <Kenpo no Kitei to Kenporon> 237,
237-58 (Shinzansha 2015). An article which criticize the stance that justify the separation of religion and state based
on experiences under Meiji Constitution, Annen Junji, Shinkyo no Jiyu, Koza Kenpogaku Dai 3 Kan Kenri no Hosho,
210-11(Higuchi Yoichi ed., Nihon Hyoronsha 1994). A work which questions about the connection between Shinto
Directive and Constitution, Ohara Yasuo, Shinto Shirei no Kenkyu 338-39 (Harashobo 1993).
34 Takayanagi, supra note 12, at 201.
35 Id.
36 Shimizu Shin, Chikujo Nihonkoku Kenpo Shingiroku dai 2 kan, 427 [2 Clause by Clause Record of Deliberations
on Japanese Constitution in Imperial Diet] (Yuhikaku 1962).
37 http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-word/word-sokui.html
31
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Criticisms have also been levied against the religious dimensions of Kenjitokeishonogi38; however,
those extend beyond this paper’s scope, which is focused on the Daijosai.
The Daijosai is not included in the above explanation because it is officially a ceremony of the
imperial house rather than a national ceremony. Although the Daijosai was interrupted for about 220
years in the past, it is considered to be indispensable for the accession, and emperor who took the throne
without conducting this ceremony was later called a ”half-emperor”39. A Shinto religious ceremony, the
Daijosai has been variously described as a “Great Ceremony of offering to the Imperial Ancestor and the
Deities by the newly-enthroned His Majesty the Emperor40” or a “Great Thanksgiving Ceremony41.” A
similar Shinto ceremony called the Niinamesai is held annually as an observance of the imperial house;
however, the Daijosai is a once-in-a-lifetime ceremony that accompanies an emperor’s accession of the
throne. Well aware of its religious nature, the government explains that “The core of this ceremony is
that the Emperor shows gratitude to the ancestors and gods of heaven and earth for public peace and
productiveness of grain. For having those purpose and its style, it cannot be denied that it is seen as
having a religious character42.” For that reason, “it is a ceremony that is not suitable for the nation to step
into the content43,” and the government prohibits it to be held as a national ceremony, a state act; rather,
it is held as a “ceremony of imperial house.”
The Daijosai is positioned as a ceremony that must be performed when the emperor accesses the
throne. The government defines the Daijosai as “an once in a throne, extremely important traditional
ceremony for succession that accompanies the imperial throne being dynastic44,” and because the
imperial dynasty is defined by the Japanese Constitution, ”It is natural that the nation to have deep
concern and take measures to enable the ceremony to be held45.” In other words, the throne’s dynasty
is defined by the Constitution, and since Daijosai is an indispensable ceremony for the dynasty, it has a
great public significance and it is natural for the government to pay the related expenses46.
Such discussions have also taken place in the Diet. As the annual Niinamesai is covered by an
“inner court expense,” or the “private money”, there have been questions concerning the difference in
treatment47. The government determined that whereas the Niinamesai is an annual private event of the
imperial family, Daijosai is held once a generation as a traditional ceremony that is indispensable for
the imperial accession, which indicates a public significance48. In response to questions concerning the
meaning of the “public character”, the government answered that those which is not purely private, the
nation has an interest in it, and appropriate to provide personal or material assistance49.
(2) Debate over the Daijosai in the Process of Amending the Imperial House Law
The state’s funding of the Daijosai was debated during the process of revising the Imperial House Law

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

The Imperial Regalia are items which are based on Shinto myths, and religiousness has been pointed out.
Momochi Akira, Seikyo Bunri Toha Nanika —Soten no Kaimei— 234-35 (Seibundo 1997).
http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/kunaicho/koho/kohyo/pdf/kihonyogo-j-e.pdf
Id.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/taii_junbi/dai2/sankou1.pdf
Id.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/taii_junbi/dai2/sankou1.pdf
Id.
Id.
Ohara, supra note 10, at 152.
Id. at 152-53.
Id. at 153-54.
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after World War II. First, in addressing hypothetical questions and answers regarding the amendment,
the Sokuinorei (ceremony of accession of the throne) was considered as a “state act” due to its intimate
relationship with the emperor’s status as defined in Article 1 of the Constitution50. To address issues
regarding the separation of religion and state, it was stated that the ceremony’s religious overtones would
be removed in the future, and the Daijosai and other ceremonies in the Three Shines of the Palace would
later be reexamined51.
In the parliamentary debate, it was stated that “matters which have religious significance are not
received naturally as national ceremonies52,” and religious elements in the accession ceremonies,
including the Daijosai, are not defined in the Imperial House Law53. However, this did not mean that none
of the Tairei (important imperial ceremonies) would be performed as national ceremonies or state acts.
Rather, it was intended to divide the accession ceremonies into two categories: religious and non-religious
events. The Imperial House Law would not be involved in the former54; however, this did not herald the
abolishment of religious ceremonies55. One asked that just as the ban on females becoming emperors
and restrictions on marriage to imperial family members are considered “exceptions” to the constitutional
provisions of gender equality and freedom of marriage, Daijosai could be treated as an exception to
the separation of religion and state56. However, the government determined that ceremonies related to
religion would be placed outside the system and continue as observances of the imperial family57. This
stance of defining religious occasions as imperial events is in line with the current government’s view.
However, what is noteworthy here is the apportionment of expenses. The government stated that
the problem has not yet been deeply considered; however, it would pay the expenses for the national
ceremony because it is a state act58. The government contended that the Constitution was not directly
settled; however, as defined by Article 88, the state’s duty to pay the expenses required for the imperial
family, therefore state should pay the expenses of religious imperial house ceremonies59. In other words,
it was determined that the national ceremony (state act) would be paid by the “same national budget as
the ordinal national expenses60” and the religious imperial house ceremonies would be covered by the
government based on Article 8861. There are some similarities between this stance and that of the current
government.
(3) Government’s Stance for Daijosai 2019, and Then Prince Akishinonomiya’s Remarks
As we have seen above, the Daijosai is covered by public expenses in light of its national significance,
despite its religious characteristics and its status as a “ceremony of imperial family”. In other words, the

50 Ashibe Nobuyuki & Takami Katsutoshi eds., Koshitu Tenpan Nippon Rippou Shiryou Zenshu 1, at 208 (Shinzansha
1990).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 237.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 326-27.
55 Id. at 327.
56 Id. at 431.
57 Id. at 431-32.
58 Id. at 327.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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government pays for the Imperial House’s “private” and ”religious” event due to its public character. The
government used the same logic when allocating funding for the 2019 Daijosai, as expressed in a cabinet
decision on April 3, 201862. Critics have decried the cabinet decision as a violation of the constitutional
separation of religion and state; similarly, then Prince Akishinonomiya expressed a different view than
that of the government. When asked about ceremonies and events related to the accession at a press
conference held on his 58th birthday in November 30, 2018, after acknowledging that the Sokuinorei was
a ceremony of the imperial family rather than a national ceremony—so that he could comment on this
topic63, the Prince stated that he had doubts concerning the appropriateness of spending public money
for such events, including the Daijosai of Heisei64, and he proposed that the Daijosai should be covered
by the private monies i.e. the inner court expense due to his concern for the constitutional principle of
the separation of religion and state65.
Thus, on the one hand, the government’s position is that although the Daijosai cannot be a national
ceremony due to the principle of separation of religion and state, it will spend national expenses on the
ceremony based on its official character. On the other hand, then Prince Akishinonomiya asserted that
the principle of separation of religion and state indicated that public expenditures should not be spent.
The cost of the previous Daijosai was estimated to be 2.24 billion yen, and the budget for the Daijosai
of 2019 is projected to be 2.71 billion yen66. Despite its public character, doubts have been expressed
concerning the constitutionality of such expenditures for religious ceremonies, and several lawsuits have
been filed. In the following section, I will review some of those lawsuits.
5. Cases Concerning the Constitutionality of the Daijosai
An injunction lawsuit based on basic taxpayers’ rights was filed against the expenditure of national
expenses for the Daijosai scheduled for November 2019; however, the court dismissed it due to the
plaintif f’s lack of standing 67. No views were expressed concerning the separation of religion and
state in the decision; however, several previous lawsuits filed in various parts of Japan have included
constitutional references. There have been two types of lawsuits filed, one of which relates to the
constitutionality of the governor’s participation in the ceremonies, and the other of which concerns public
spending on the Daijosai68. This section will review one case of each type.

62

https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/content/kihonhoushin.pdf
https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/20181129-OYT1T50081/. Ar ticle 4 of Japanese constitution prohibits
emperor to act politically, as states ”The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in
this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government.” Nihonkoku Kenpo [Constitution][Kenpo]
art.4 (Japan). Accordingly, not only the emperor, but other members of the royal family are also prohibited from
interference to the politics, including political speech. Then Prince Akishinonomiya justified his argument against
public payment to Daijousai, because Daijousai belongs to the “private sphere of Imperial House”. However,
authority to making budget bill belongs to the cabinet, and authority to make decision about the budget bill belongs
to the Diet (Nihonkoku Kenpo [Constitution][Kenpo] art.86 (Japan).) Therefore, criticism can be made against then
Prince Akishinonomiya because he argued against the decision of the cabinet and the Diet about the national budget,
which is a highly political matter.
64 https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/20181129-OYT1T50081/
65 Id.
66 https://www.sankei.com/life/news/181221/lif1812210026-n1.html
67 Tokyo Chihou Saibansho Feb. 5, 2019. Text is available from plaintiff’s Website. http://sokudai.zhizhi.net/?p=135
68 For the detailed record of former case especially in the Supreme Court, please see Oguri Minoru, <Shiryou>
Daijosai Iken Sosho (8) <Jokokushin-hen Sono 1>: Kagoshimaken Chiji no Daijosai Shusseki ni Tsuiteno Jumin
Sosho no Kiroku [<Material> Documents of the Case Daijosai: divine ceremony after the Enthronement (8)], Vol. 35-1
Kagoshima Daigaku Hogaku Ronshu 81-141 (2000). Oguri Minoru, Daijosai Iken Sosho (9) <Jokokushin-hen Sono 2>:
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(1) Supreme Court Decision69
A prominent example of the first type of case is the Supreme Court’s judgment based on the so-called
purpose/effect test in a case filed in Kagoshima. The court affirmed that Daijosai is “the ceremony in
which the Emperor shows gratitude to the ancestors and to the gods of heaven and earth for public
peace and productiveness of grain. This ceremony was carried out under the Shinto manner at Daijokyu
halls where Shinto facilities are installed70” and the governor’s attendance and worship represented an
entanglement between the state and religion71.
However, the judgment also pointed out the public, or secular aspects of the Daijosai, namely that ①

it is an important traditional ceremony regularly held as accession of throne, ② the governor received
an invitation from the Imperial Household Agency and attended and worshipped at Yukidenkyousennnogi
(a ceremony which forms a par t of Daijosai) with the heads of the three powers, ministers, and
representatives of local governments, and ③ the Daijosai is a traditional ceremonial celebration of
the symbolic emperor’s throne in the traditional ceremonies, and public officials’ participation is an
appropriate social courtesy72. As such, the purpose of the governor’s participation was “to perform a
social courtesy for the Emperor, which is the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, as the
traditional ceremony of Imperial House accompanied by accession to the throne73” and the effect is not
those “aid, assist, encourage, or oppress, or interfere for a specific religion74.” As such, the court declared
that the relationship with religion does not exceed the “allowable limit”. Two additional Supreme Court
cases involving the accession ceremony also questioned the propriety of public officials’ participation;75
however, no direct constitutional judgments were made concerning the constitutionality of Daijosai itself.
(2) Decision of the Osaka High Court76
In contrast to the above cases, the lawsuit filed in Osaka requested an injunction against public
spending on Daijosai, confirmation of its unconstitutionality, and payment of damages against public
spending77. The court denied standing and dismissed the case; however, it expressed opinions on the
Daijosai and separation of religion and state in its dicta.
The court examined each of the Sokuinorei’s component ceremonies, stated that the religious nature
of the Daijosai was clear, and declared that in light of the purpose/effect test, “at least as an act of
assistance, encouragement to state Shinto, the doubt that violation of provision of separation of religion

Kagoshimaken Chiji no Daijosai Shusseki ni Tsuiteno Jumin Sosho no Kiroku [Documents of the Case Daijosai: divine
ceremony after the Enthronement (9)], Vol. 37-1,2 Kagoshima Daigaku Hogaku Ronshu 3-36 (2003). And for the latter,
Soku, Dai Iken Sosho Dan ed. Tenno-sei ni Idonda 1700 Nin (Ryokuhu Shuppan 1995).
69 1799 Hanrei Jiho 99(Sup. Ct. Jul. 11, 2002). Text is available from the Website of the Courts, and in this article, the
page number is based on the website. http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_jp/273/052273_hanrei.pdf at 2.
70 Id.
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74 Id. at 3.
75 799 Hanrei Jiho 101(Sup. Ct. Jul. 9, 2002), and Sup. Ct. Jun. 28, 2004 (http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_
jp/312/015312_hanrei.pdf).
76 Gyoshu 46.Gyoshu 2,3, 250 (Osaka Kosai Mar. 9, 1995). Text is available from the Website of the Courts, and in
this article, the page number is based on the website.(http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_jp/273/052273_
hanrei.pdf).
77 See generally, Id.
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and state cannot be denied unconditionally78”. The court also stated that despite efforts to reduce the
religious character comparing to the Sokuinorei under the former Togyokurei and accompanying rules, it
still followed those rules in a large part: the Takamikura and the Kusanagi-no-Tsurugi embodying Shinto
mythology were used, and it was conducted in relation with the Daijosai and related ceremonies and
events; thus, the breaching of the separation of religion and state cannot be unconditionally denied, as
was the case for the Daijosai itself79. In this case, the plaintiff was defeated because standing was denied;
the plaintiff did not appeal, and so the ruling was finalized.
The example presented in the preceding subsection did not discuss whether or not the Daijosai is a
violation of the separation of religion and state; however, the court pointed out its secular or ceremonial
aspects while also acknowledging its religious nature. However, the latter judgment makes a deeper
consideration and raises serious doubts on the constitutionality of Daijosai itself in the light of the
separation of religion and state.
6. View of Academics
In the section above, I roughly introduced some legal precedents. Below, I will examine academic’s
theories concerning the constitutionality of Daijosai80.
(1) Theory which sees Daijosai Unconstitutional
In discussing the Kagoshima case, Professor Koizumi criticizes that the Court failed to fully consider
the objective situation concerning the purpose of the participation, namely: ①the strength of the
ceremony’s religiousness, ②many public officials did refuse to participate or participated in a private

capacity due to concerns regarding violating the principle of separation of religion and state, thus
indicating that there were alternative means of conveying congratulations81. In addition, regarding the
point of the ceremony deriving its public character from the imperial dynasty, Professor Koizumi argues
that although the dynasty is a constitutional principle of accession to the throne, this neither requires nor
justifies traditional ceremonies, or the tradition does not lessen their religious character82. He argues that
affirming the public character to the religious ceremonies violates the principle of separation of religion
and state.
Professor Tsuchiya agrees that it is a violation of separation of religion and state to make Daijosai
a public ceremony (a state act) or to be publicly involved in an official capacity83. Under the Meiji
Constitution, the Daijosai was inseparable from the Imperial Shinto and the state Shinto under the
emperor system by divine right (Shinken Tennosei); however, the basis for it to be held as a national
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ceremony has been lost under the current Constitution, which enforces the denial of the emperor
system by divine right 84. As such, the Daijosai lost public character and is nothing but a mere
religious ceremony 85. Similarly, Professor Mori argues that the ideological devices that supported
the emperor system under the Meiji Constitution had been denied and abolished by the conversion
of the constitutional principle; thus, making Daijosai publicly held ceremony is equivalent to their
resurrection86. Professor Kudo also points out that Japan lacks a national religion and the denial of the
emperor’s deification is a core premise of the current Constitution87. Professor Kobayashi agrees that
the Daijosai is “a religious ceremony inseparable with the Emperor system by divine rights that was
purposefully excluded88” by Japan’s defeat in the war and the change of constitutional principle89. As such,
they conceive that the emperor’s religion was abolished from the “public space” by current Constitution.
Strong arguments have been made against the stance of government and the court that finding
ceremony of accession of throne public significance and justifies the spending of public money does
not distinguish between the “norm” and “reality.” For example, Professor Sasagawa argues that the
Constitution only defines the Imperial dynasty and its qualifications; thus, the dynasty does not require
the Daijosai in the world of norm90. Rather, it is the world of reality that makes Daijosai an essential
ceremony for the accession of the throne91. In this way, he divides the world of norm from the world
of reality, and although that the Daijosai belongs solely to the latter (it should be noted that Daijosai is
not articulated in any law in Japan), both government and the Court have conflated those two different
dimensions92. In addition, in his view, the court decision that sees governors’ attendance to Daijosai
as merely a secular act that “showing respect to the status of symbol” is incorrect because it cannot be
derived from the law what kind of attitude should be taken against the “symbol” in the first place; thus,
reiterating the ceremony’s position in the world of reality93. On that basis, the governor should have
maintained religious neutrality, and “courtesy” is an inadequate justification for participation in a religious
ceremony94.
Professor Sasagawa asserts that “The way of succession to the throne must be based on the principle
of the national sovereignty, respect for basic human rights, and separation of religion and state in light
of the purpose of the Constitution, which is the highest law of the state.95” Professor Kobayashi similarly
points out that the Imperial Household Law allows and predicts the performance of ceremony of
accession of the throne in accordance with the constitutional order as granted96. The religious character
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of emperor is excluded from the public space and is incompatible with the principle of separation of
religion and state. As such, spending public money on the Daijosai and the participation of public officials
in the ceremony are argued to be unconstitutional.
(2) Theories which see Daijosai as Constitutional
In contrast to the above scholars, Professor Momochi, citing the view of Professor Ide, emphasizes
the emperor’s continutiy with the current Constitution and a traditional figure imbued with ceremonial
qualities. Professor Momochi’s view is that the Constitution establishes a symbolic emperor system
(shouchoutennousei); however it does not clearly specify the lineage when defining the imperial dynasty,
emperor Hirohito continued to be the emperor as granted, and this can be interpreted as a continuation
of the traditional emperor system97. Moreover, the Imperial Economic Law stipulates the venerable things
that are inherited with the throne; however it does not define exactly what they are, it is interpreted that
the “Imperial Regalia” are contained therein98. As such, the current Constitution and laws are interpreted
based on the traditional figure of the emperor. The emperor as such a traditional existence is defined
as a symbol in the current Constitution, based on which he claims that “emperor as symbol in current
Constitution = traditional emperor.99” Thus, Professor Momochi argues that the Constitution affirms the
traditional emperor system, and the Daijosai can also be positioned as an public or state ceremony of
accession of throne100. Based on this tradition, he argues that the Constitution approves the Daijosai101.
Based on the above understandings, Professor Momochi discusses the constitutionality of the Daijosai
as a public act and as a state act. First, as the separation of religion and state covers the “act of the state or
its institution,” the public act of the emperor is not considered as an act of national institution; thus, it is
not directly applied, and the Constitution will not be violated unless it violates religious neutrality102. Even
if it is a state act, so long as the Constitution stipulates the imperial dynasty, the indispensable ceremony
of the Daijosai is naturally accepted, and it is recognized as an exception to the separation of religion and
state along with the issue of the ban on empresses and gender inequality103. Even if this is not the case, it
will be constitutional in light of the purpose / effect test104.
Similarly, Professor Ide suggests that the succession of imperial family is the same as the succession
of the emperor’s status as symbol105. As such, it is unnatural to separate the ceremony of succession
of imperial family from the succession ceremony of emperor’s status106. As he argues, a person
becomes emperor based on his succession to the head of the imperial family107. Mr. Ide points out
that the ceremonies of the imperial house have traditionally been conducted in the Shinto manner, the
continuation of which is assumed by the dynasty clause108. As such, the Constitution recognizes the
emperor’s tradition from the front.
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(3) Summary
Thus far, we have seen the views of both sides concerning the constitutionality of the Daijosai, which
center on the point of whether the emperor and his inseparable religiousness should be excluded from
public space (and kept in the private domain) or if we should find value in this tradition and approve
public involvement. Professor Sasaki argues that the Constitution positioned the Shrine Shinto outside
of the national organization as a result of the dismantling of state Shinto; however, by simultaneously
keeping the dynastic emperor as a constitutional organ, and puts emperor Hirohito in that position,
the Constitution itself engenders the problem of the monarch’s religion109. Thus, he highlights the
contradictory structure of the Constitution110.
In this situation of “contradiction”, one side grasps that the Constitution “purposefully excluded” the
religious aspect of the emperor. That is, the emperor’s divine character and state Shinto were denied and
expelled by the conversion to the current Constitution. There is no room for public recognition of these
elements under the current Constitution, as they are purposefully excluded, and since the Daijosai is the
center of such a ceremony, the principle of separation of religion and state prohibits public involvement. It
is recalled that the principle of separation of religion and state originally focused on the exclusion of state
Shinto. Here, Professor Sasaki’s contention that “understanding of the constitutional structure about how
to secure the area of application of modern principle from erosion by premodern remnants is needed111”
is noted.
The other side does not perceive that the emperor’s religious character has been “excluded” from
public space but rather finds value in its “traditional” aspects. The issue of whether the being of the
emperor under the current Constitution is continuous or disconnected from that under the previous
history (and Meiji Constitution) has been debated; however, they perceive that the current Constitution
assumes the emperor’s continuity (claiming that the Constitution assumes emperor’s traditional aspects)
and associates the imperial dynasty with traditional ceremonies. As such, traditional ceremonies—which
are imbued with religious aspects—are perceived as being essential to the emperor’s being. As the
imperial religious ceremonies are inseparable from the emperor’s heritage, it is natural that they should
be held publicly.
The Japanese Constitution drafted after the World War II reflects the nation’s introspection regarding
the Meiji Constitution and other “ways of doing” under Meiji Constitution. As such, it inevitably embodies
many discontinuities from previous practices. However, it is also true that some issues are not fully
addressed during the drafting of the current Constitution. In addition, as Professor Sasaki points out,
embedding a religious entity, the emperor in the Constitution engendered tensions in the separation of
religion and state. The problem of whether a traditional emperor with religious character is a given in the
Constitution or if the “divine” emperor was purposefully excluded lies at the root of the debate over the
Daijosai and the separation of religion and state112.

109 Sasaki Hiromichi, Sokui no Rei Daijosai to Seikyo Bunri no Gensoku, 217 Bessatsu Jurist Kenpo Hanrei Hyakusen
I, at 107 (6th ed. 2013).
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important work, Sato Koji, Kokuji Koi to Seikyo Bunri, 933 Jurist 101 (1989).
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7. Conclusion
As the above discussion highlights, there is tension between the Daijosai and the separation of
religion and state. Lawsuits have been filed, judged, and new lawsuits are still pending; thus, this topic is
not a thing of the past. Ceremonies of accession of the throne have national significance and are closely
related to Article 2 of the Japanese Constitution. However, from the perspective of separation of religion
and state, Japan does not have a national religion like the United Kingdom, and denial of the emperor’s
deification is claimed to be a major constitutional premise113. On that basis, many argue that the position
of emperor should remain non-religious in public spaces.
As Professor Kudo points out that, like traditional kings, the emperor is a ceremonial being114 whose
presence is centered on ceremonies. The emperor system has been linked to all forms of government
in Japan from ancient times to today, and although there have been changes over time, as Professor
Lokowandt emphasizes, the position has always been based on Shinto and the emperor’s role of
conducting Shinto ceremonies115, which are closely related to tradition, culture, and religion. As such, the
emperor, the ceremonies, and Shinto are inseparable. Many have advocated separating the private and
public spheres of the emperor; however, the distinction between the emperor’s public and private is not
clear-cut and this makes the problem more complicated.
Professor Sasaki views the problem of the Sokuinorei (ceremony of accession of the throne) and
Daijosai—which also evoke the topic of monarch’s religion— and separation of religion and state as
being inevitable in a constitutional monarchy116. He points out that Japan’s principle of the separation of
religion and state is largely based on those provisions of constitutions of the United States and France,
which lack hereditary monarchs117, and highlights the need for an interpretation that is distinct from that
prevailing in those countries118. Although this is an important point, such problems are not unique to
Japan. Elements of Christianity appear in various forms in public and political spaces in the United States,
including swearing on the Bible during the presidential oath. Although ceremonial deism continues to be
debated on many fronts, such frictions related to the separation of religion and state are inevitable as long
as the state and political spaces are rooted in society and culture119.
The problem of the Dijosai can be grasped on some level as merely another example of broader
issues related to the separation of religion and state; however, there is certainly a unique context in the
case of Japan. The Constitution of Japan was established after the end of World War II in the context of
“introspection” and “correction” of the ways prevailing under the previous Constitution. The separation
of religion and state was largely rooted in the aim to revise the relationship between Shinto and state. As
to the propositions concerning the emperor system, main interest was in the grounds of the Emperor’s
status (from deity to national sovereignty), changes in status itself (sovereign to symbol), and the
transition of sovereignty (emperor to national). This “context” is placed on one side; however, in addition

113

Kudo, supra note 8, at 47.
Id. at 46.
115 Lokowandt, supra note 3, at 482.
116 Sasaki Hiromichi, Sokui no Rei Daiosai to Seikyo Bunri no Gensoku, 154 Bessatsu Jurist Kenpo Hanrei Hyakusen I,
at 106-07 (4th ed. 2000).
117 Id. at 107.
118 Sasaki, supra note 109, at 107.
119 See generally, Naruse Thomas Makoto, Gireiteki Rishinron ni Tsuite, 28 Hikaku Kenpogaku Kenkyu 129-54 (2016),
and articles cited in that article.
114

Daijosai and the Separation of Religion and State

045

to this context of the Constitution, there is also the context of the tradition of the emperor in connection
with Japanese history, culture, and society. There has been active discussion on whether the being of the
emperor under the current Constitution is continuous or disconnected from that of the emperor under
the previous Constitution and of seen in earlier history.
A conflict between these two contexts was inevitable because the Constitution simultaneously
maintained the emperor system and provided for the separation of religion and state. The milestone of a
new accession to the imperial throne has merely reiterated a longstanding issue.

